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Introduction 
At present, Europe pursues four different approaches
to contain the debt crisis. First, countries with exces-
sive ratios of debt to GDP are to implement policy
reforms that – in the medium term – should reduce
their debts. Second, a leveraged version of the
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) has been
set up. It is supposed to provide liquidity to Italy and
Spain for at least a few months should their refinanc-
ing conditions deteriorate further. Third, the
European banking authority (EBA) is pushing banks
to increase their capital ratios as early as 2012.
Fourth, the ECB is continuing to buy government
bonds on the secondary market in order to lower their
interest rates and maintain their liquidity.
The first measure can only yield positive results in the
medium term. The other three measures are intended
to prevent a severe banking crisis in the short run. In
principle, each of these three measures is suited to pre-
vent the worst consequences of a complete drying out
of GIIPS sovereign debt markets. A leveraged EFSF
could provide liquidity to Italy and Spain for some
time while those countries work on their credibility.
The same holds for the ECB’s interventions on the
secondary market. A substantially higher equity
endowment of banks would instead help to avoid the
worst consequences of possible debt restructuring
programmes.
However, authorities currently attempt to undertake
all three measures at the same time. In this paper we
argue that the attempts to lever the EFSF do not
agree with the new capital requirements of the
European Banking Authority (EBA). The most likely
outcome will be that the ECB will have to significant-
ly increase its activities on the secondary market for
government debt or that the European states have to
increase their contributions to the EFSF.
The EBA’s plans
At the European summit of 26 October 2011 it was
decided to leave it to the European Banking Authority
to draft a text for an initiative to raise capital require-
ments in the EU. The EBA released its recommenda-
tions on 8 December 2011. 
The new capital requirements are the following. First,
those institutes which are affected by the initiative
should achieve a core tier 1 capital ratio of nine per-
cent by June 2012. Second, additional capital buffers
have to be introduced to cope with possible losses
from exposures to government debt in the eurozone.
The size of these buffers is determined by banks’
exposure to central and local governments of the
European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The dif-
ference between market prices and the current balance
sheet valuations determines the required additional
capital buffer. To avoid banks’ immediate sell-off of
government bonds, the capital buffer is to be calculat-
ed on the basis of September 2011 data (European
Banking Authority 2011a).
As almost all major banks are exposed to eurozone
sovereign risk, the overall minimum capital ratio –
according to this new regulation – will be above 9 per-
cent. In October 2011 the EBA estimated that an
additional 106.4 billion euros will be needed to fulfill
the new core tier 1 capital quota. The additional cap-
ital buffers were estimated to add up to 40.6 billion
euros (European Banking Authority 2011b). How  -
ever, these were just initial EBA estimates. The final
numbers and additional data were initially expected to
be released in mid-November. It was then later
announced that the data will be published by the end
of November. In December the data was finally
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released with an overall shortfall of 114.7 billion
euros and a capital buffer of 39.4 billion euros
(European Banking Authority 2011d).1
According to the EBA, the new requirements shall
mainly be achieved by an increase of equity endow-
ments and the reinvestment of profits. Accordingly,
the EBA is appealing to banks to reduce dividend and
bonus payments. 
The EBA additionally requires banks to seek approval
by their national supervisory authorities of their
plans on how to fulfill the new capital requirements as
of 20 January 2012. The national supervisors shall in
turn consult with the EBA (European Banking
Authority 2011a). This procedure shall prevent exten-
sive deleveraging. Hence, national supervisory
authorities are likely to only approve plans if they
believe that these will not restrict the national credit
supply too much.
Incentive problems of the capital initiative may
increase spreads
The EBA’s preferred solution is that banks acquire the
new capital on the financial markets. However, the
current state of the market situation may make this
difficult. There is a limited willingness to invest in
assets that are tied to default risks in the GIIPS coun-
tries. The EBA’s critical position with respect to divi-
dend payments is another potential obstacle for banks
to get access to new capital. 
The required capital buffers will lead to a great de  -
mand for new capital by banks with high GIIPS expo-
sures. The GIIPS countries themselves will have to
compete with European banks for that capital. This
will make it more difficult for those countries to raise
credit. 
Banks have the option to reduce their country-specif-
ic risks by selling government bonds. According to the
currently announced regulation, this would not
change the size of the required capital buffer.
However, selling GIIPS bonds should enable banks to
get access to groups of more risk-averse investors.
Some of the recent measures and announcements of
EU leaders have been characterized by a very short
time horizon. The EBA seems to continue this trend.
The news agency Reuters reports that there have been
discussions within the EBA about changes to the
terms of the capitalization initiative (Reuters 2011b).
Furthermore, according to banking circles, the data
templates, used for the determination of the final cap-
ital shortfalls, requested information on additional
risks that was not part of the previous queries. There  -
fore, banks cannot preclude the possibility that the
rules will be adjusted once again along the way. In the
end, the current amount (and not the value of
September 2011) of sovereign exposures could be
used as a reference for the shortfall of bank capital.
This creates additional incentives for the banks to
divest themselves of government bonds. 
Limits of governmental capital injections
The question of the proper origin of new capital for
the banking system was already discussed during the
negotiations on the revision of the Basel capital
requirements (Basel III). The fear to overwhelm the
markets by too fast an introduction of new rules led
to a gradual implementation of the requirements over
a period of five to ten years (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision 2011).
The currently planned capitalization of the European
banks differs from that approach. Although it may be
argued that the capital market would have expected
the banks to strengthen their capital base faster in any
case, it is questionable whether the markets would
have forced such a quick introduction by mid-2012.
According to a Citigroup study, the European banks
have already raised new capital of more than 270 bil-
lion euros since the end of 2008 (Citigroup Inc. 2011).
Therefore, the banks are likely to need new sources of
capital for a further private sector capitalization.
As an alternative, EU governments could provide part
of the missing capital. Some proponents of this
approach refer to the governmental capital injection
of American banks after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in 2008. However, one key difference
between the EBA capitalization and the US recapital-
ization is that the latter was carried out at a time when
the US public debt was not yet in the focus of finan-
cial markets. Against this background, it may be diffi-
cult for some countries to fund the missing shortfall
of capital. As an ultimo ratio the funds of the EFSF
could be used for this. However, this would mean that
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less capital were available to guarantee new govern-
ment bonds.
If there is not enough private capital available in the
markets and if the resources of the EFSF are not to
be exhausted for bank capitalization, the affected
banks will ultimately have to scale back their lending
business. This would reduce the risk-weighted assets
and thus reduce the EBA capital shortfall. National
supervisors are primarily required to safeguard their
national financial systems. Hence, one may assume
that banks will reduce their lending, especially outside
their home markets. This would lead to a certain re-
nationalization of capital markets. The shortage of
the supply of credit could also affect the real economy
because of the risk of a credit crunch. As a result, the
capital buffer in particular could have a pro-cyclical
effect. The purpose of such a buffer should be that
banks can make use of it in times of crisis to enable
them to continue to lend. For that purpose it has to be
established in advance of a crisis.
The ‘voluntary’ renunciation of private creditors and
hedging strategies
The so-called voluntary renunciation by banks as
holders (creditors) of Greek government bonds
causes additional difficulties. From the perspective
of the banks it will be difficult to understand that
banks, which hold Greek government bonds and
hedged this position through a credit default swap
(CDS), do not get any compensation, because they
are giving up their claims against Greece voluntarily.
Why should banks believe in a possible insurance
approach of the EFSF if the legal occurrence of a
clear credit event is prevented? In the end, a similar
approach might be used for other countries and the
20 to 30 percent coverage would not be paid because
the insured event (the official default of the country)
has not occurred.
In addition, it may be attractive for the banks to
divest themselves of sovereign bonds, as these bonds
are worth more in the hands of non-private investors.
When this consideration is shared by many banks, this
will further reduce the market price of the bonds. One
can argue that, in the case of Greece, the divestment
of sovereign bonds from the banks’ balance sheets
would make a haircut less problematic. Nevertheless,
the case of Greece could constitute a precedent in the
view of the banks, which could help to explain the
current sales of Italian bonds.
Analogously, one can explain a reluctance of the
banks when it comes to sign newly issued government
bonds. There is a risk that the issuers could change the
conditions of the bonds afterwards. This risk may dis-
courage banks from continuing to operate public
finance business at its current level.
The voluntary renunciation has also an effect on
potential private investors in banks. In making their
investment decision they will now focus on the gross
positions against the GIIPS-countries on the banks’
balance sheets. The consideration of net positions
would be affected by the risk that hedging strategies
could be worthless if the credit events do not occur
officially.
The EBA capitalization would not be enough in case
of an Italian default
At present it does not appear that the European gov-
ernments are willing to prepare for a haircut of Italy
or Spain. But at the same time the provisions of the
EBA speak a different language, as the capital buffers
are calculated based on the exposure to sovereign debt
from these and other countries. This is not a good sig-
nal for investors.
Moreover, the EBA’s estimated aggregate capital
shortfall in Europe of about 100 billion euros (provi-
sional numbers) would not be enough to cover signif-
icant losses. In a scenario of a further dramatic wors-
ening of the European debt crisis it is likely that this
capitalization is not sufficient to prevent a systemic
banking crisis. This is because the buffer would not
react to the falling asset market prices due to an esca-
lation of the situation. 
It is extremely difficult to determine the aggregate
losses of the banking system and thus the recapital-
ization that would be required for restoring the capi-
tal base in a situation with several simultaneous hair-
cuts in the periphery of the eurozone.2 One reason for
these difficulties is that the ownership of government
bonds changes continuously. Another reason is that in
such an extreme situation the feedback effects form
the real sector back to the banking system are difficult
to estimate.
The IMF estimates a magnitude of approximately
200 billion euros for the losses of European banks in
2 When the state recapitalizes a distressed bank, the losses of the
bank are in general larger than the losses of the state because the
state receives assets in exchange of at least part of its investment (see
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the event of a more severe debt crisis. Another 100 bil-
lion euros of losses could arise due to spillover effects
within the banking system (IMF 2011). In similar sce-
narios, Credit Suisse expects a capital shortfall of
220 billion euros (Credit Suisse 2011), while Goldman
Sachs expects 298 billion euros (Reuters 2011a).3
If there is a political request for an increase of bank
capital, it should be sufficiently large to avoid bank
failures, even if the debt crisis leads to haircuts in
more than one country. The previous figures indicate
that the approach of the EBA is half-hearted.
Every year, international bonds and notes with a
volume of about 2–2.5 trillion euros are issued in
the eurozone. The total volume of government bond
issues is much smaller. Against this background it is
clear that the additional capital demand that would
be triggered by an appropriate recapitalization of
the European banks is substantial. Whether raising
this amount is possible in times of a recession and a
general economic and banking crisis is an open
question. 
Clear signals are needed
It makes a difference whether regulators ask banks
to increase their capital before a crisis or during a
crisis. In the absence of a crisis this policy is useful to
strengthen investor confidence in the banking sys-
tem. However, to demand an increase of banks’ cap-
ital during a crisis may signal a high risk of signifi-
cant write-downs and may trigger additional assets
sales.
Investors’ reluctance to co-finance the EFSF indicates
that a leveraged EFSF will only work if investors can
expect Europe’s governments to definitely avoid a
haircut in Italy and Spain. If, instead, the EU govern-
ments send an unclear signal by leveraging the EFSF
and simultaneously increasing banks’ capital require-
ments, banks’ investors will not rule out further hair-
cuts for country in the eurozone. Accordingly,
investors may find an investment in the EFSF too
risky.
European leaders have to state clearly why an increase
in banks’ capital is desired at this time. They have to
identify the countries for which a default is ruled out
and those for which a default cannot be ruled out.
The EBA’s statements regarding this point are not
suited to resolve the current uncertainty in this mat-
ter.4 It is also not clear why a capital buffer, which is
not needed, should actually reassure investors.
Moreover, the currently demanded capitalization
would not be enough to cover the losses which would
obtain if Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland
would all be subject to a haircut.
One should not try to simultaneously prepare the
EFSF for a large-scale support program for Italy and
to prepare banks for a possible Italian default. This
policy may be one of the reasons why risk premia for
Italy have increased substantially in October and
November 2011. 
It is also necessary for the EBA to make its capital
requirements transparent and reliable in order to
avoid additional adverse effects. At this stage, the
EBA, the national governments and the national reg-
ulators can still make an effort to reduce the short-
term burden imposed on their banks by the EBA’s
recent recommendations. Europe should definitely
exclude an Italian default and give the Italian govern-
ment time to implement further policy reforms. The
ECB can contribute to the functioning of the EFSF
by continuing not to rule out further interventions in
the secondary market. 
Summary
The eurozone’s governments have to decide whether
they want to provide liquidity to Italy through the
EFSF or whether they prefer to prepare the European
banking system for an Italian default. Doing both at
the same time is difficult and may further increase the
risk premia of Italy’s bonds.
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